Background The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 severely impacted the health sector in Mongolia. Limited public funding for the post-Soviet model public system and a rapid growth of poorly regulated private providers have been pressing issues for a government seeking to reestablish universal health coverage. However, the evidence available on the role of private providers that would inform sector management is very limited. This study analyses the current contribution of private hospitals in Mongolia for the improvement of accessibility of health care and efficiency. Methods We used mixed research methods. A descriptive analysis of nationally representative hospital admission records from 2013 was followed by semi-structured interviews that were carried out with purposively selected key informants (N ¼ 45), representing the main actors in Mongolia's mixed health system. Results Private-for-profit hospitals are concentrated in urban areas, where their financial model is most viable. The result is the duplication of private and public inpatient services, both in terms of their geographical location and the range of services delivered. The combination of persistent inpatient-oriented care and perverse financial incentives that privilege admission over outpatient management, have created unnecessary health costs. The engagement of the private sector to improve population health outcomes is constrained by a series of issues of governance, regulation and financing and the failure of the state to manage the private sector as an integral part of its health system planning. Discussions/Conclusion For a mixed system like in Mongolia, a comprehensive policy and plan which defines the complementary role of private providers to optimize private public service mix is critical in the early stages of the private sector development. It further supports the importance of a system perspective that combines regulation and incentives in consistent policy, rather than an isolated approach to provide regulation.
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 severely impacted the health sector in Mongolia. Mongolia was completely integrated with the former Soviet Union both politically and economically (Pomfret 2000) , and the combination of the loss of Soviet subsidies and a move towards democratization contributed to privatization in the health sector. Prior to 1990, the Mongolian health system followed the Soviet Semashko model (Rechel et al. 2014) , with universal access to a comprehensive range of services free at the point of use (Rechel et al. 2013) . Government owned and run hospitals were financed from the general government revenues, with a preference for inpatient care that persists into current services (The World Bank 2007) . As with most former Soviet countries-excepting Georgia and Armenia-Mongolia has retained public ownership of most hospitals, with privatization emerging in addition to public services (Rechel et al. 2014) , and the health system evolving into a mix of public and private provision.
Re-establishing universal health coverage (UHC)-providing everyone access to the health services they need without financial hardship- (Rodin and de Ferranti 2012 ) is a pressing policy issue for the Government of Mongolia (GoM). Limited public funding for health and rising out-of-pocket health expenditure, reaching 40% of total health expenditure in 2013 (Bayarsaikhan et al. 2015) is of concern, and the rapid growth of private providers who rely heavily, sometimes solely, on out-of-pocket payments, plays an important role.
Identifying effective ways of harnessing and regulating growing private health care providers, who work outside the direct administrative control of Government, towards UHC is a shared challenge in Low-and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) (Stallworthy et al. 2014) . Despite the significance of private health care and the imperatives for adequate regulation and management, the evidence available on private health care providers in LMICs is limited (Walker et al. 2009 , Ranson et al. 2010 . This lack of analysis affects most former Soviet countries, with those in Central Asia ranked as least studied (McKee et al. 2012) , and in Mongolia, the emergence of private health providers and their role in the provision of health services has not previously been examined.
In Mongolia, although there are no data available on private outpatient care, this study has used access to total hospital admission records to enable an analysis of private inpatient services, and the contribution of private hospitals, particularly in terms of accessibility and efficiency. As private providers' roles are shaped by public sector providers in mixed health systems (Mackintosh et al. 2016, McPake and Hanson 2016) , comparison between the private and public sector has been made throughout the whole analysis. This research provides much needed evidence on the contribution of the private sector to inpatient health care in Mongolia.
The Mongolian health care context
Brief description and development phases of the private health care sector in Mongolia The private health sector, in this paper, refers to those privately owned health facilities providing health care, excluding pharmacies and private insurers. Private providers in Mongolia essentially refer to the formally registered, small-to-medium private practices described in the classification of private providers offered by McPake and Hanson (2016) : underqualified providers; non-forprofit; and corporate and commercial providers do not have a significant presence. Private facilities make up 76% of all health facilities, though they only account for one fifth of total hospital beds and health sector workers and comprise clinics and small hospitals with limited beds-most with <26 beds (Government of Mongolia 2015) .
Private hospital and clinics provide secondary and tertiary level care, though there is considerable overlap between these two levels as service packages for these levels are not clearly differentiated. In one case, a privatized district hospital offers the full range of district hospital functions, delivering secondary level care to the Bayanzurkh district population. There are very few private hospitals comparable to public sector general hospitals in terms of their size and range of services delivered, though they differ from public hospitals in having better infrastructure, technology and responsiveness. The remaining small hospitals provide a limited range of specialized services.
The development of the private health care sector in Mongolia has gone through three phases: 1. 1990-1999 
Key Messages
• For a mixed public-private health system like Mongolia, characterized by a dominant public hospital sector, but with increasing small to medium sized formal private providers, a comprehensive policy and plan defining the complementary role of private providers to optimize private public service mix is critical in the early stages of the private sector development.
• Government management and regulations that were not grounded in a system level comprehensive policy, and without adequate enforcement, have resulted in the duplication of private and public inpatient services in Mongolia, both in terms of geographical location and the range of services delivered.
• A balance of both statutory and market-harnessing approaches is critical: targeted incentives and contracting are crucial for engaging private investments in areas and services where private sector contributions may be important, while statutory regulations may be crucial for preventing duplications and subsequent inefficiencies.
• Ultimately, a MOH management approach needs a shift towards managing and stewarding both public and private providers as integral, complementary parts of the mixed health system. their size and range of services provided and dual practitioners increasingly committed to either the public or private sector. Some state-owned health facilities-including one district hospital-were fully privatized (Bolormaa et al. 2007 (Tsolmongerel et al. 2013) .
But private providers cannot be understood in isolation, outside the context of the mixed health systems in which they exist. The contextual determinants of hospital behaviour can be explored using the framework formulated by Harding and Preker (2000) : i) governance; ii) provider payment mechanisms; and iii) the market environment.
Governance: relationship between government and providers From 1990, the main reforms of the Mongolian health system focused on gaining allocative efficiency in the system through scaling back the oversupplied, specialized hospital capacities-particularly in the capital city-Ulaanbaatar-and strengthening primary care in Mongolia (Bolormaa et al. 2007 ). Similar reforms have been undertaken in other former Soviet countries because an oversupply of specialized hospitals in urban settings is a common characteristic of Soviet Semaskho health systems (Rechel et al. 2014 , Rechel et al. 2013 . Public hospital bed numbers were reduced from 97 to 73 per 10 000 population between 1995 and 2004 (Bolormaa et al. 2007 ), though still far exceeding numbers in the European Union (The World Bank 2007). Public hospitals continue to be funded directly from the budget through the MOH, and though the recent Hospital Services Law of Mongolia 2016 is intended to increase their autonomy, it has not been implemented yet.
The Health Sector Specific Strategic Plan 2005-2016 (HSSMP) included provisions to establish an 'optimal public private mix of services' by offering the private health sector roles complementary to the existing public sector (Government of Mongolia 2005), though subsequent detailed policy guidelines have not been formulated. Government licensing authorities have been granting permission to operate to private hospitals based mainly on the accurate completion of documentation, with no consideration of their quantity and distribution compared to local health needs (GVG Consultancy Team 2010) . The primary motivation for accreditation by private hospitals is eligibility for reimbursement from the national mandatory Health Insurance Fund (HIF). The original intent of the Health Insurance Law of Mongolia 2006 was limited to reimbursement for services not available in public hospitals, but this limitation has not been observed (Tsolmongerel et al. 2013) . The consequent increase in private hospital beds as a product of these trends has compromised concurrent reforms aimed at downsizing overall hospital capacity (Bolormaa et al. 2007 ).
Provider payment mechanisms Public hospitals are paid by three different methods: line item budgets from state funds, case-based payments from the HIF and userfees (World Health Organization et al. 2015) . Most private hospitals access only HIF funding and user-fees. Line item budgets account for at least half of all revenue for most public providers while on average both public and private hospitals receive about 30% of their revenue from the HIF (World Health Organization et al. 2015) . The HIF pays private hospital inpatient care at half the rate used to pay public hospitals (Government of Mongolia 2013) with the exception of Bayanzurkh district hospital and a few private district surgical care providers. User-fees are a small share (less than five percent) of the total revenue for all public providers, but are the only source of revenue for private hospitals that have no contract with the HIF.
Market environment
Market conditions such as consumer demand, the ability to pay and competitive environments are also important contextual factors (Harding and Preker 2000) . Recent economic growth in Mongolia has led to an emerging population with middle and upper level incomes who prefer private providers because of perceptions of better services, technology and ease of access (GVG Consultancy Team 2010) . Although public providers have a financial advantage over private providers, receiving direct public funding in addition to the re-imbursement from the HIF and user fees, HIF contracts that provide access to health insurance funding for private providers promotes some competition, given perceptions of higher quality in the private sector. The proportion of health insurance contributing to total health expenditure remains low, however, (Bayarsaikhan et al. 2015) and the lower levels of payment from the HIF to private providers, combined with public sector subsidies, is felt by private providers to create an unfair competitive environment (GVG Consultancy Team 2010).
Methods

Study design
We used a mixed-methods approach of quantitative and qualitative techniques. An explanatory sequential design was used, in which the quantitative analysis was supplemented with a qualitative analysis to clarify findings (Ozawa and Pongpirul 2013) . A descriptive analysis of hospital admission records was followed by in-depth interviews. The exception was in defining inappropriate admissions, where qualitative interviews pointed to specific areas of concern, corroborated by additional statistical analysis.
Descriptive analysis of hospital admission records, Mongolia, 2013
We analysed nationally representative hospital admission records (n ¼ 664 952) for 2013. This analysis aimed to: i) identify the geographical distribution of private hospital admissions; and ii) the main types of private inpatient services delivered by private hospitals, in comparison with public hospitals. It should be noted here that in Mongolia, all health facilities, including primary level health centres, clinics and small or large hospitals, are called 'hospitals' (GVG Consultancy Team 2010) . Hence, in practice, it is quite common to differentiate hospitals by the presence or absence of inpatient beds. This data has been collected from all primary, secondary and tertiary level hospitals with inpatient beds, including 399 public and 197 private hospitals at the Centre for Health Development (CHD) of Mongolia, which is responsible for managing nationwide health data.
The purpose of this dataset is to collect morbidity information on inpatient care in Mongolia, which contributes to national health reporting. All hospitals that admit patients are required to submit electronic records of inpatients using an approved file format. Unit record information is collected monthly from hospitals for all patients separated during the reference month (Ministry of Health of Mongolia 2011). Once the data are received by CHD, validation checks are performed, and hospitals are asked to make corrections when necessary.
The dataset contains administrative data items such as provider type, provider location and the department where the patient was admitted; patient's name, address, birthdate, national identification number, employment status, health insurance status, payments for services; and clinical data including disease coding of all conditions. From this dataset, the hospital type variable was used to differentiate hospitals by their ownership, private and public. The provider's location variables were used to define the geographical distribution of providers: Ulaanbaatar or provinces; districts in Ulaanbaatar or soums in provinces. Mongolia consists of 21 provinces and the capital city-Ulaanbaatar. Provinces are subdivided into soums numbering 343 while Ulaanbaatar city consists of 9 districts. The variable for the department where the patient was admitted was used to define main types of services delivered. The variables for the diagnosis of the patient, derived from International Classification of Diseases 10 (ICD10) in the original dataset, were grouped by 19 broad categories of ICD10 and used to differentiate patients within a single department in terms of their diagnosis.
The original data was in Mongolian and translated into English by the first author. Data were cleaned and examined for reporting and measurement errors in Stata according to set protocols, crosschecking variables and identifying duplications (Mitchell 2010) . First, the provider's location variable (by Ulaanbaatar/provinces) was corrected after cross-checking with the variable for the name of the provider. For example, seven Soum Health Centres (SHCs), located in the provinces, were recorded as being in Ulaanbaatar; the locations of these hospitals were corrected. These corrections applied only to public hospitals because private hospitals were all coded as 'private hospital', and not differentiated by individual name, though their location allowed differentiation between private admissions in Ulaanbaatar/provinces or districts/soums. Second, having checked the provider's location variable by Ulaanbaatar/provinces, the provider's location variable by districts/ soums was then cross-checked against it. Some 711 observations without valid codes were removed from the analysis. The variables that identified the department where the patient was admitted and diagnosis of patient were checked individually for consistency and observations with no records were removed from the analysis. Duplications were identified using patients' national identification number, which is unique for each person, admission date and family and first name and 1898 duplicated observations were removed from the analysis.
The majority of variables were categorical (namely: location of hospital, types of services delivered, diagnosis of patient), hence proportions of different categories in the private and public sector were compared using chi-squared test (Carlin and Doyle 2001) . Stata 13 was used to conduct all analyses.
In-depth interviews
After the quantitative analysis, 45 in-depth interviews were carried out with purposively selected key informants, representing the main actors in Mongolia's mixed health system. Table 1 provides a description of the in-depth interviewees. Interviews were conducted with the objective of exploring i) the current role of private providers; and ii) engagement and regulation of private health care providers in Mongolia. All interviews were conducted in Ulaanbaatar in 2015 by the first author in Mongolian using a semi-structured interview guide. Interviews were recorded, with the permission of the respondent, using a digital audio recorder, transcribed in Mongolian and translated into English, and coded and analysed in NVivo11.
Results
Hospital admissions and their geographic distribution
Descriptive analysis The distribution of admissions between public and private hospitals at different levels of care in 2013 is presented in Table 2 . The public sector delivered 82% (n ¼ 544 234) of inpatient services while 18% (n ¼ 119 438) of all admissions were in private hospitals. For the public sector, the CHD lists specific hospitals and their levels of care, but does not disaggregate private hospitals by their specialty and the level of health care. Mongolia has a unique system in that there are public hospitals with inpatient beds at the primary care level in remote areas (Tsolmongerel et al. 2013 , MoH 2004 . These facilities delivered 20% (n ¼ 133 151) of inpatient care in 2013. The largest proportion of admissions took place at the secondary level (35%, n ¼ 233 747), which consists district and provincial hospitals, maternity homes and other hospitals. This is followed by tertiary level general hospitals and speciality centres that are specialized in a single area like cancer that delivered 27% (n ¼ 177 336) of inpatient care in 2013. Table 3 describes the geographical distribution of hospital admissions at the country level and in Ulaanbaatar, respectively. In general, hospital admissions were almost evenly divided between Ulaanbaatar (46%) and the remaining 21 provinces (54%). Sixty percent of private hospital admissions were located in Ulaanbaatar. Furthermore, almost all admissions to private hospitals outside the capital were in provincial capitals (95%). In contrast, the majority of the public hospital admissions were in the provinces, and 43% of them were to facilities in remote soums. Reasons for urban concentration of private hospital admissions were explored during in-depth interviews with key informants.
In-depth interviews: reasons for urban concentration of private hospital admissions From the private provider's perspective, the urban concentration of private hospitals was explained by market exposure: motivated by profit, they tend to locate in Ulaanbaatar, where almost fifty percent of the population live, and where those with more ability to pay for private services are likely to be concentrated. Without clear incentives from the government, private providers argued that it would be hard to survive in rural areas with low population numbers and where people are limited in their ability to pay for services.
From the perspectives of international organization and government informants, private sector growth in cities is politically supported, however, there has been no clear policy to facilitate private sector development in the health system. This was typically explained by the frequent turnover of senior government staff and short term policy decisions developed by politicians. There were four Health Ministers between 2010 and 2015, and each brought major changes in the MOH senior staff and new policy directions. Consequently, granting licenses for private providers was mainly determined by political preference rather than long term health system policy.
'In 2015, we granted licenses for more than hundred private hospitals and clinics in Ulaanbaatar following a direction from the city Government not to restrict private providers entering the market because the tax that they will pay is important for increasing the government budget.' (Government regulatory body)
Interviewees from international organizations emphasized the importance of stewarding the health system as a whole, including both the public and private sector. As they explained, the MOH provides direct management only to public hospitals, and does not see the private sector as an integral part of the system, and thus included in health system goals and management.
Finally, GoM lacks technical and financial resources for the regulation of the geographical distribution of providers. The MOH introduced a two-step licensing procedure for health facilities in 2013; first, granting a Certificate of Need (CON), and second, granting permission to operate. The first step aims to review new proposals based on the assessment of the provider's capacity and workload against population health needs in the particular location, where the new private entity is to be located (government regulatory body). However, the application of this new regulation has been poor. ' Even though MOH introduced the CON into licensing, it is not clear indeed, who will conduct the health needs assessment and how, and what criteria and funding will be used for it. Therefore, this is not implemented in practice.' (Representative of international organization)
Types of services by private hospitals
Descriptive analysis Figure 1 depicts the distribution of hospital departments where patients were admitted, while Figure 2 presents the distribution of diagnoses of admitted patients. Both figures show that first, private providers delivered fewer types of services than public providers. Second, private hospital patients are most frequently admitted for internal medicine, neurology, traditional medicine, gynaecology, otorhinolaryngology and ophthalmology. In contrast, users of public hospitals are most frequently admitted for childbirth, child health care, surgery, accidents and injuries, infectious diseases, cancer and mental health. The reasons for these different patterns of admission in the two sectors were sought during in-depth interviews.
In-depth interviews: explanations for private inpatient services Interviewees considered that consumer demand is high in the areas of internal medicine, neurology and traditional medicine due to the high morbidity associated with diseases of the circulatory, digestive, respiratory and nervous systems (professional network and private provider). In addition to the high morbidity, however, popular health seeking behaviour creates further demand for admission. With 70 years of the hospital oriented Semashko system, there is an historic preference for admission, regardless of clinical need, contributing to the survival of small private hospitals (professional network and public provider). This is compounded by perverse incentives arising from HIF reimbursement for inpatient, but not outpatient care (professional network). Even though the existing public sector capacity is insufficient for childbirth, child health care, accidents and injuries, and cancer, lower private admissions were explained by several factors from a private provider's perspective. Firstly, these diseases are complicated, and require significant resources and capacity, and unpredictable costs. Secondly, most of these high frequency diseases are fully financed from the State budget, and hence, free in the public sector, reducing consumer demand for private services in these areas. Thirdly, there are no clear regulations or incentives offered to support the development of private services to complement public capacity.
Government regulators have made some efforts with a statutory approach to mobilize private resources for high demand areas, with the licensing authority announcing high priority areas for new hospitals in Ulaanbaatar including child health care, injury, surgery, childbirth and mental health. However, without incentives, these have not been successful (regulatory body). Public hospital managers were critical of the current contribution of private hospitals: although the number of private hospitals has been growing in areas surrounding the public sector hospitals, the workload in the public sector has not decreased. More complicated cases are mainly treated in the public sector, as the majority of private hospitals are not equipped to deal with them. Formal referral processes between private and public hospitals have not been created, and as a result, patients in private hospitals with complications that need urgent intensive care are simply discharged, and advised to seek public care. However, private hospitals will admit patients who have been refused admission at neighbouring public hospitals, or who would otherwise face lengthy waits for admission, raising concerns around inappropriate admission in the private sector.
As standardized service packages for outpatient and inpatient care are not defined in Mongolia, it is therefore challenging to determine which conditions should or should not be admitted to hospital, so we sought advice from clinical representatives of the key professional groups, to explore conditions that typically do not require hospitalization, but are frequently admitted to hospital.
Inappropriate hospital admissions
Descriptive analysis Inappropriate admission can be defined as an admission that does not result in any significant benefit for the patient, or which results in benefit which could have been obtained at a lower level of care (Eriksen et al. 1999) . Guided by the perspectives of our key informants, four ICD10 diagnoses-conditions that would typically not require hospitalization-were selected to act as proxies for inappropriate admission: I10 (Essential hypertension), N11 (Chronic renal tubulo-interstitial nephritis), G44 (Other headache syndromes), G54 (Nerve root and plexus disorders). Table 4 provides the distribution of these four diagnoses in the departments of internal medicine, neurology and traditional medicine, where they are found most frequently. The proportion of admissions for these cases was statistically significantly higher in the department of internal medicine (27.66%) and neurology (26.2%) in private hospitals than those in public hospitals (21.74% and 17.14%, respectively) (P-value <0.001). Inappropriate admissions accounted for 19% of all admissions in the both sectors in the department of traditional medicine, though there is no statistically significant difference between the two sectors (P-value ¼ 0.940).
In-depth interviews: conditions that do not require hospitalization and root causes Clinical representatives of professional associations and committees under the MOH were categorical in their judgments that there were several diagnoses where clinicians deferred to patient preferences and expectations, resulting in inappropriate hospital admissions.
'Patients with hypertension should be managed in outpatient settings through proper diets, physical activity and regular use of medicine, but they are frequently admitted to hospital.' 'Patients who had headache and back pain are usually diagnosed by G44 and G54 in Mongolia and they are clear examples of inappropriate admissions.'
Interviewees indicated that inappropriate admission occurs frequently in both public and private hospitals due to a number of factors. Firstly, the health seeking behaviour of people, and a hospital admission system that does not depend on clinical decision-making alone, play an important role. Patients who do not need inpatient care often find a way to be admitted to public hospitals, using networks of friends and colleagues in the MOH or public hospitals (public provider). As private hospitals are not inclined to reject requests for admission, there is a higher potential for unnecessary admissions in the private sector (professional network). Secondly, the gate keeping role of primary care is poor, whether this is due to doctor's limited knowledge of appropriate criteria for admission, or the absence of clear differentiation of service packages for each level of care (professional network). Finally, re-imbursement from the HIF for private inpatient care, but not private outpatient care, supports higher admissions, as outpatients pay full user-fees, and inpatients exempt (professional networks).
Discussion
This is the first study providing data on admissions to private hospitals in Mongolia, a nascent-but rapidly increasing-sector. This study uses routine data-hospital admission records-to assess the contributions of private providers with the supplementation of long term observation of the health system, and perspectives from key informant qualitative interviews. This is consistent with the recommendations of Rockefeller Foundation experts to use low-cost secondary data analysis (e.g. household surveys, patient exit surveys and direct submission of routine health data by providers) as an alternative to costly market research (Lagomarsino et al. 2009 ). This study provides an exemplar of this approach for similar LMICs. Private-for-profit hospitals are concentrated in urban areas, and in particular the capital, where their financial model is most viable, resulting in duplication of public inpatient services, both in terms of their geographical location and the range of services delivered. The combination of persistent inpatient oriented systems and perverse financial incentives that privilege admission, have created room for inappropriate admissions and unnecessary health costs. According to key informants, the potential to engage the private sector to improve population health outcomes is constrained by a series of underlying factors: issues of governance, regulation and financing and the failure of the state to manage the private sector as an integral part of its health system planning. The findings of this study have application to similar LMIC, and in particular Post-Soviet contexts.
The private sector provides some coverage, but limited strategic contribution to the health system Studies in Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and many African countries have demonstrated that private for profit providers tend to concentrate in urban centres if the government does not regulate the volume and geographical distribution of providers (Morgan and Ensor 2014 , Hort and Annear 2012 , Doherty 2015 . Growth of private hospitals, even in cities, can be beneficiary for countries like Vietnam that aim to use them to increase hospital beds where supply is inadequate (Hort et al. 2011) . However, for countries like Mongolia, where urban centres are already oversupplied with public hospitals and rural areas are undersupplied (The World Bank 2007 , MoH 2004 , the unrestricted growth of private hospitals in urban areas does little to contribute to the reduction of geographical barriers to accessing health services, may compromise the equity of access proposed under UHC (WHO and The World Bank 2014).
Complementarity of services defines private sector contributions to the health system
While duplication of private and public services in the same location remains problematic, this can be justified if the types of services they deliver are complementary to each other. In mixed health systems, where a small private sector competes with a dominant public sector, private providers often focus on a narrow range of specialized and financially profitable services (McPake and Hanson 2016) . Where these private services do not replicate, but are complementary to existing public services, providing advanced technologies or niche therapies not available in the public sector, this may enhance the contribution of private providers in fulfilling public health goals.
But the current Mongolian experience shows that private services are more likely to duplicate than complement public services. In the areas where there is insufficiency in the public sector-child care, child birth, cancer and injuries-private sector contributions are limited. Rather, they are focused on certain specialties like internal medicine and neurology that are also offered widely in the public sector and provide a lot of scope for inappropriate or unnecessary admissions.
Private and public sectors both face shared problems in efficient health care provision Despite assumptions that the market driven private health sector is more efficient, a recent systematic review , comparing the performance of public and private health care providers in LMICs, found that private providers had a greater likelihood of lower efficiency due to unnecessary treatments and tests. Morgan and colleagues (2016) argue that the performance of the private sector is inherently linked to the performance of the public sector.
Our findings support both studies. In Mongolia, patterns of inappropriate admission are found in both public and private hospitals, though arguably more prominently in private. Unnecessary hospitalization is a common issue in former Soviet countries with a tolerance of longer bed-stays, long term and social admissions (Rechel et al. 2013 , Rechel et al. 2014 . In Russia and Ukraine, one third of hospitalizations are unnecessary (Rechel et al. 2013) , and patients with hypertension, rarely requiring hospitalization in western countries, are ten times more likely to be admitted than in OECD countries (Smith and Nguyen 2013) . This pattern persists in public hospitals in Mongolia, and in the emerging private sector, with these failures best explained as systemic problem level, rather than public or private issues. The factors identified by key informants as driving inappropriate admissions-hospital oversupply, poor gatekeeping capacity in primary care, and cultural preferences-are shared with many former Soviet countries (Rechel et al. 2014, Rechel and McKee 2009 ). The MOH needs policy coherence to effectively manage both sectors in a single health system
The recent series in the Lancet on 'UHC: markets, profits and public good' (Mackintosh et al. 2016 , McPake and Hanson 2016 , Montagu and Goodman 2016 , Morgan et al. 2016 , points to the need for a comprehensive policy that includes both public and private services in an Optimal Public and Private Mix. The analysis of admissions between sectors and the explanatory commentary of key informants suggest that the Mongolian MOH lacks this comprehensive coherent policy. The HSSMP that has provided Mongolia with a planning framework spanning multiple administrations, did not clearly map this out. While governments seeking to move mixed health systems towards UHC must identify appropriate roles for private providers (Marten et al. 2014 , Stallworthy et al. 2014 , in Mongolia at present, there is no defined complementary role for the private sector in addressing public sector gaps. Due to the absence of a comprehensive policy embracing the private sector, regulation and financing for private services have not aligned with successive waves of system reforms. The introduction of licensing regulation by the MOH that initiated the uncontrolled growth of private hospitals (GVG Consultancy Team 2010) occurred at the same time as public sector reforms advocated downsizing hospital beds and inpatient care (Tsolmongerel et al. 2013) . The decision of the HIF to offer health insurance reimbursements for private inpatient, but not outpatient services, was inconsistent with reforms supporting outpatient or day care as alternatives to expensive inpatient care (Government of Mongolia 2005). The failure of the HIF to use the financing of public and private services to constrain service duplication (Tsolmongerel et al. 2013) can be explained by the absence of a clear differentiation between public and private hospital roles. In addition, governance issues have compounded these problems, with the HIF having no purchasing power, and being dependent on the decisions of the MOH (Bayarsaikhan et al. 2015) .
In light of an unstable post-Soviet political history, and strong political influence on the upper levels of the public service, government policies, regulations and financing in Mongolia have been inconsistent. With the rapid turnover of MOH senior staff following political change, long term institutional memory is lost. Rather than a stable bureaucracy providing policy continuity between successive governments, policies have been driven by politicians (Bayarsaikhan et al. 2015) . Consequently, policies are inconsistent, and fragmented, often lacking sustainability and technical instruments of action. The licensing of private health facilities, without a planning framework for health service provision, is a pertinent example. International experience shows that continuity of reform is an important determinant of good health systems. The consistent formulation and implementation health sector plans by experienced technocrats, and the protection of the health system from political interference, have contributed to Thailand and Kyrgyzstan's better health outcomes at low cost (Balabanova et al. 2013) . The development of a comprehensive and inclusive policy frame and sustained governance functions are critical if Mongolia is to harness private providers as a resource for achieving UHC.
Both statutory regulation and incentives are necessary if the private sector is to fill gaps in the health system Under the guidance of a comprehensive policy both statutory regulation and incentives can be used to harness private hospitals to improve accessibility to essential services and enhanced system efficiency. Although the success of statutory regulation has been very limited in LMICs (Ensor and Palmer 2009 , Morgan and Ensor 2014 , Akhtar 2011 , for countries like Mongolia, it remains one of the few tools to prevent the over-supply of hospitals, and the duplication of public and private services. The key mechanisms in Mongolia are licensing for private health facilities and the CON. The establishment of a clear definition of private providers and the types of services they provide facilitates planning around the distribution and range of services. The CON, which has been widely used in the USA for the prevention of duplication of services (Afifi NH et al. 2003) , has recently been initiated in Mongolia. At present, however, government licensing authorities do not have the technical and financial resources required for appropriate assessment (GVG Consultancy Team 2010), and its effectiveness as a regulatory tool is consequently limited.
Given the limited success of statutory regulatory approaches in LMICs, attention has been shifting to market harnessing and incentive oriented regulatory approaches (Ensor and Palmer 2009 , Akhtar 2011 , Morgan and Ensor 2014 , Afifi NH et al. 2003 . In other international studies, various targeted incentives such as the provision of capital, loans, tax exemptions, and contracting have been used to encourage private hospitals to set up in underserved areas, offer certain services, and/or provide services to particular populations (Afifi NH et al. 2003 , Bloom et al. 2014 .
Mongolia has used contracting with private providers with some success. Contracting with private hospitals for provision of surgical care for the district population has the advantage of improving the accessibility to surgery care at the district level and decreasing the higher costs for equivalent services at tertiary level public hospitals. An unpublished local study that compares a privatized district hospital with equivalent public district hospitals, shows the privatized hospital, funded only from HIF reimbursements but efficiently managed, retains more surplus funds to renovate the hospital, invest in advanced equipment and provide incentives for staff (Javkhlanbayar 2012) . With some improvements (e.g. strategic purchasing, equal payment rate for public and private providers) contracting with private providers may improve accessibility and affordability of services. Additional targeted incentives could be the beneficiary for encouraging investment from the private sector for high priority services.
This study, using secondary data analysis, has some limitations that should be considered. Firstly, the primary responsibility for the quality of the data, including the quality of clinical coding of diseases, rests with the data provider (i.e. hospitals). This may have influenced the accuracy of the data, but as this data was collected for national health reporting, rather than for financing purposes, it minimizes the extent to which perceived financial incentives might bias the accuracy of data. Secondly, the most recent data are available for 2013, though key informant interviews conducted in 2015 suggest that patterns described have not changed substantially.
In conclusion, the Mongolian experiment shows that for a mixed system like in Mongolia, a comprehensive policy and plan which defines the complementary role of private providers to optimize private public service mix is critical in the early stages of the private sector development. It further supports the importance of a system perspective rather than an isolated approach to provider regulation, where private providers and their regulation became a dominant but disproportional concern. A balance of both statutory and market harnessing approaches is critical, as is consistency in regulation and its enforcement. Targeted incentives and contracting are crucial for engaging private investments in areas and services where private sector contributions may be important while statutory regulations may be crucial for preventing duplications and subsequent inefficiencies. Lessons from the Mongolian experience may benefit former Soviet countries with emerging private hospitals to facilitate the development of a private health sector towards UHC in a strategically planned manner.
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